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ABSTRACT
West Africa, like any other region in the world, has had to swallow its fair
share of modern-day political, economic and social dilemmas. One phenomenon that
has had huge negative implications on the political, economic and social spheres of
almost every country on the face of the earth is the production, trafficking, marketing
and consumption of illicit drugs. The countries in West Africa have not been spared
of the negative consequences of illicit drugs. While some countries have an illicit drug
production problem, others have a consumption problem. The countries in West
Africa have an illicit drug trafficking problem.
The current transcontinental drug trade in hard drugs in West Africa is rising
at such a high rate and has captured the attention of the world because of the
magnanimity of the negative political consequences in the region. The scale of the
current Latin American drug trade transmitting through West Africa has never been
seen before and so are its political consequences in the region. The fact that
diplomats, political figures, non-governmental organizations and almost all sectors of
civil society and security services are so concerned about it justifies how very
different the present West African international drug trade has become. There is a
very high chance that if the current trend in drug infiltration continues, most
countries, especially Guinea-Bissau, in the region will be plunged into chaos and
political instability because they do not have strong institutions to deal with the
infestation. In other words, the infiltration of the region by Europe-bound illicit drugs
from Latin America, coupled with the weak institutions in most of the region’s sixteen
countries, will result in sustained political disorder. Therefore, a well-researched
thesis on this contemporary phenomenon is warranted.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
West Africa, like any other region in the world, has had to swallow its fair
share of modern-day political, economic and social dilemmas. One phenomenon that
has had huge negative implications on the political, economic and social spheres of
almost every country on the face of the earth is the production, trafficking, marketing
and consumption of illicit drugs. The countries in West Africa have not been spared
of the negative consequences of illicit drugs. While some countries have an illicit drug
production problem, others have a consumption problem. The countries in West
Africa have an illicit drug trafficking problem. And that’s the focus of this thesis.
“Trafficking and West Africa have a long and very interesting common
history, dating way back to the Moorish and Touareg caravans which have been
crossing the Sahara since time immemorial and to the Peul and Dioula traders who
have traversed sub-Saharan Africa all the way to Chad and the Sudan, and south to the
Congo River for centuries now (Shehu 2009, p. 1).”
I clearly remember from my high school history lessons, that in the 16th
century, when the first European ships docked in trading towns along the Atlantic
coast in West African; they barter traded with the natives in several products
including gold, diamonds, and able-bodied young African men and women in
exchange for rum, spicy products, and gun powder. Many historians in Africa
regarded this business relationship between West Africans and Europeans as
exploitation of the natural riches of the continent by the monarchies in the United
Kingdom and Portugal. I must state that the triangular slave trade, which was
trafficking in humans, is today referred to as one of the cruelest chapters in global
human history.

Due to a host of conducive factors, chiefly, weak state institutions, and in
some cases their total absence, since the mid-1990s, trafficking in hard drugs has
become a booming business (Shehu 2009, p. 1) in Central and West Africa. Although
the production, trafficking and consumption of cannabis and other soft drugs has
always been present to some extent, the introduction and transshipment of hard drugs
such as heroin and cocaine from outside the region has had serious negative political
implications for the region. However, in the words of the scholar Stephen Ellis, “West
Africa has a long history of involvement in the international trade, that has been
dominated by Nigerian interests especially (Ellis 2009, p. 171).” In his piece titled
“West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” Ellis reveals, “the roots of the current
collaboration between drug traders in these two sub-continents go back more than a
decade ago (Ellis 2009, p 171).” However, I shall partially dispute Ellis’ argument
that international drug trade in West Africa is not a new phenomenon. I think the
same argument could be made of the relationship of drugs trade and any other
continent that has rung alarmed bells.
What I argue in this thesis is that the current transcontinental drug trade in
hard drugs in West Africa is rising at such a high rate and has captured the attention
of the world because of the magnanimity of the negative political consequences in the
region. I will argue that the scale of the current Latin American drug trade
transmitting through West Africa has never been seen before and so are its political
consequences in the region. The fact that diplomats, political figures, nongovernmental organizations and almost all sectors of civil society and security
services are so concerned about it justifies how very different the present West
African international drug trade has become. Therefore, a well-researched thesis on
this is warranted.

This thesis is divided into five main chapters. The introduction chapter
introduces the reader into the topic of this thesis.
This is followed by a background chapter, which, as the name implies, gives an
exhaustive background into the transnational drug trade in West Africa that involves
Latin American drug cartels seizing on the opportunity created mainly by weak
institutions to use the region as a transit hub for trafficking Europe-bound cocaine and
heroin.
The chapter that follows is the literature review. In this chapter, I dissect the
various arguments advanced by well-respected scholars and authors on the
relationship between state institutions and lootable resources such as alluvial
diamonds and illicit drugs. Since there isn’t a specifically well-developed literature,
besides what’s published in the public news media, on the relationship between illicit
drugs and state institutions, the chapter dedicates several pages on the relationship
between state institutions and a similar, but in many respects different product,
alluvial diamonds.
In the research design chapter, I discuss how I am going to be conducting my
research: what I mean by state institutions, and the yard stick for measuring the
strengths and weaknesses of state institutions; what I mean by illicit drugs and how to
measure their global scale; the negative consequences of the relationship between
illicit drugs and state institutions, contextualizing the relationship between the weak
state institutions in Guinea Bissau and the Latin American drug cartels.
I plan to get the information for my thesis from various sources which include
text books, academic journals, data bases, such as Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index and the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index Scores,
websites of public news media, and other online sources.

This thesis ends with a conclusion and recommendations chapter, which
basically outlines the way forward for a West Africa that is drug free and
characterized by politically stable, strong, state institutions.

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Can Latin American illicit drugs such as heroin and cocaine politically
destabilize West Africa like the way minerals (alluvial diamonds) had done to the
region ten, fifteen, twenty years ago? Why have Latin American drug cartels diverted
their drug trade through West Africa? What logistical arrangements do these drug

cartels employ to transport cocaine and heroin through West Africa to Europe? The
scope of my thesis includes, but is not limited to the research for answers to the
questions above. The centerpiece of my research is to argue the role especially that of
Guinea-Bissau that weak state institutions play in the enhancement and facilitation of
this transnational drug trade.
Before proceeding, it is imperative to briefly describe the West African region.
West Africa is one of the five regions (east, west, north, south and central) on the
African continent. West Africa covers a land area of approximately 6,140,000 square
kilometer or one-fifth of Africa. The region consists of sixteen countries, namely:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo. Great Britain and France were the main European countries to have colonized
West Africa. Most West African countries have either English or French as their
official national languages (Julia 2009, p 1). All but Mauritania comprise the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a regional economic
bloc that aims to eliminate all economic barriers to ensure the free flow of goods and
people within the region (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p.242).
West Africa is one of the poorest and least stable regions in the world. All but
three of the sixteen countries in the region are on the United Nations list of “least
developed countries,” including five with the very lowest levels of human
development (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p 242). West Africa has
experienced at least fifty-eight coups and attempted coups, including some in as
recent as the year 2009. Until today, there are many active rebel groups operating in
various countries in the region (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p 242). Presently,
of the fifteen nations of the ECOWAS, about half are experiencing some form of

instability. Long-standing insurgences are found in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali,
Niger, and arguably Nigeria (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p 242). Both Liberia
and Sierra Leone have been recovering from brutal civil wars. According to a 2010
rating titled Peace and Conflict 2010, conducted by Ted Robert Gurr, Jonathan
Wilkenfeld and Joseph Hewitt of the University of Maryland’s Center for
International Development and Conflict Management, of the twenty five countries
with the highest risk of instability globally, nine were in West Africa: Benin, Guinea
Bissau, Mauritania, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Niger (UNODC World Drug
Report 2010, p 242).
Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and the early part of the twenty-first century,
West Africa had been at the brink of political, economic and social collapse due to the
curse of mineral resources such as diamond and gold. We have seen during those two
decades how an influx of illicit money fueled violent conflicts in Sierra Leone and
Liberia (Feingold 2009, p 1). With arms purchased from funds obtained in the illegal
diamond trade and laundered in European financial institutions, the Liberian and
Sierra Leone rebels terrorized their respective peoples for a decade, leaving an
estimated 200,000 and 300,000 people dead, thousands of children mutilated and
thousands of women raped (Ku, et al, 2009, p. 270).
However, as stated above, today, there is a new scourge that has negatively
affected the political stability of the West African region: the infiltration of West
Africa’s state institutions by Latin America drug cartels. Over the past few years,
Latin America drug cartels have been using the West African region as a transit hub
for transporting cocaine and heroin bound for lucrative markets in Europe.
Large scale illicit drug trafficking was first noticed in the region in 2004,
which was symptomatic of a shift in the center of gravity of the global market from

the United States to Europe. West Africa traffickers had long been involved in smallscale import and marketing of illicit drugs in Europe, as they have been in many other
parts of the world. But around this time, individuals based in West Africa began to
provide logistical assistance to Latin American drug traffickers in organizing their
maritime shipments to Europe from at least two hubs: one centered on Guinea Bissau
and Guinea Conakry on the north, and one centered on the Bight of Benin in the
South; both involving Nigerian traffickers (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p242).
The international police organization (Interpol) estimates that more than a
third of the cocaine arriving in Europe is trafficked through West Africa (Winter
2007, p 2). Consequently, there is general concern among experts and law
enforcement agents that this lucrative illicit business could destabilize West Africa.
Diplomats and other international officials worry that West African countries could
develop along similar lines as Mexico, where drug gangs have a symbiotic
relationship with political parties and with the state and drug-related violence results
in thousands of deaths every year (Ellis 2009, p172).” It can be argued that the
massive profit gains from the drug trade can potentially be used to fund criminal and
violent enterprises in the region, if they aren’t already, which further exacerbates
instability (Feingold 2009, p1). The infiltration of the region by “drug syndicates
poses a real challenge to democracy and the rule of law, good governance and
progressive economic sustainability, the fabric of West African communities, and the
plight of the West African youth (Minteh 2010, p 10). In 2007 the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for West and Central Africa echoed similar
sentiments: “the exploding cocaine trade in West Africa is perverting weak economies
and corrupting broad sectors of the society, the youth, police, military officers, and
senior government officials. The lure of lucrative cocaine profits is posing a grave

threat to security and public health in an impoverished region that until now has never
faced a serious drug problem (Destrebecq 2007, p10).” I shall state that the rate at
which drug cartels have expanded their illicit operational tentacles, across the region,
have been quite alarming and troubling. They have established networks of operation
in all but five West African states. At least nine top-tier Latin American drug cartels
have established bases in eleven West African nations because there is less law
enforcement in West Africa, just as there is more profit in Europe than the United
States (Daily Trust 2009, p1). Out of all countries in West Africa the most heavily
affected and threatened are: Guinea Bissau, Senegal, The Gambia, Nigeria, Togo,
Benin, Liberia and Mali (Chothia 2010, p 4). This explains why retired four-star
Army General Barry McCaffrey, who was drug policy director during the Bill Clinton
presidency, said West Africa is particularly attractive to traffickers because it is near
the “soft underbelly of Europe (Daily Trust 2009, p1).” The phrase soft underbelly
means the “part of something such as an organization or plan that is weakest and
easiest to attack (www.macmillandictionary.com).” I believe that this characterization
of West Africa in relation to the illicit Latin American drug trade reflected the
accurate situation on the ground.
The illicit drug trade poses a great danger to the region especially its value
compared to local economies. This economic reality allows traffickers to pierce
through to the very highest levels of government and the military. Law enforcement
officers can be offered more than they can make in their lifetimes to look the other
way. This extreme leverage has allowed traffickers to operate with very little
resistance from the state, and therefore, there is little need to resort to violence.
However, there appears to have been violence in elite circles as rivals compete for
access to these profits (Horta 2007, p2). Guinea Bissau provides an example. The

country was one of the first to be affected by the illicit drug trade in the region, and
due to the small size of its economy—in 2008 its GDP was $400 million— one of the
worst affected. The drug trade seemed to be quickly monopolized by the military,
controlled by top-ranking military officials. These officials have threatened all who
dare to discuss their involvement. From 2007 onwards high-level officials have
accused the military of running the drug trade, including the Interior Minister and the
head of the judicial police. Drugs have been detected arriving on military airstrips;
military officers have been arrested in possession of hundreds of kilograms of
cocaine; and there have been several armed stand-offs between police and military
forces concerning drug shipments (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p244).
Most West Africa experts and policy makers have identified the following
reasons for this new scourge in the region:
•

Weak state judicial and security institutions;

•

Unguarded and porous borders;

•

Increased drug law enforcement in the Caribbean;

•

The lucrativeness of the drug trade in Europe;

•

Number of failed states in the region;

•

Abject poverty due to failed governments’ economic policies;

•

Corrupt and underpaid government officials and security officers; and

•

The geographic proximity of West Africa to Europe and to the three
Latin American nations that “produce nearly all of the world’s
cocaine— Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (www.allafrica.com 2009).”

Here I explore three of the seven reasons that explain the importance of West
Africa as a transit point for cocaine trafficking to Europe. But, as stated above, my
emphasis is on the role of weak state judicial and security institutions.

First, there have been increased law enforcement successes in the Caribbean
and in Europe, which have played a part in the development of alternative routes for
traffickers. Spain is the main entry point of cocaine into Europe and traffickers exploit
the historic and linguistic ties with Latin America, as well as its long coastline. In
2005, Spain’s seizures of 48 tons of cocaine accounted for 45 percent of all cocaine
seizures made in Europe, and rose by almost half from 2004 to 2005 after Spanish
enforcement agencies intensified their control along the northern coast. The bulk of
66% of Spanish cocaine seizures is made at sea. The Netherlands is another traditional
entry point for cocaine into Europe. In recent years, Dutch authorities have enforced a
100% controls policy on flights from specific Latin American countries, a procedure
that may have prompted some traffickers to find different channels, notably through
Africa (Destrebecq 2007, p6).”
Second, the geographic position of West Africa makes it an ideal staging post
from South America to the growing market in Europe. Cocaine shipment destined to
Europe frequently transit through Venezuela and Brazil. The shortest distances
between these countries and West African countries are around 10 degrees of latitude
north and it is exactly where the Spanish and British Navies have made most cocaine
seizures with a link to Africa. So many cocaine seizures destined to Africa have been
made in this Atlantic band (Destrebecq 2007, p6).
Third, West African countries are perceived as having a permissive working
environment for drug traffickers due to widespread corruption and poor law
enforcement structure. Many countries in the region face difficulties in controlling
their territory, to administer justices, and are plagued by corruption (Destrebecq 2007,
p6). A striking evidence of the weak law enforcement capacities in Africa can be
derived from the comparison of cocaine seized by African authorities with the

volumes seized by European navies off the coast of Africa. In 2005, the total cocaine
seizures for all 53 African countries amounted to about 2.5 tons, while in 2005, in a
single catch, the Spanish navy seized three metric tons in a Ghanaian ship,
representing almost 40% more than the cocaine seizures on the entire continent.
Over the years, the increased demand for cocaine and heroin in Europe has
also contributed to this problem. There were an estimated 3.5 million cocaine users in
Europe in 2006, a number that increased to 4.5 million in 2007, and again to 5.5
million in 2008 (Kurtzleben 2009 p1).
The United Nations estimates that annually 50 tons of cocaine worth about $2
billion is transported through West Africa to Europe (Destrebecq 2007 p3). Some
counter-narcotics experts have said the figures are higher than what most people
think. Peter Burgess, a counter-narcotics project officer for the US military’s Africa
Command (AFRICOM), believes that over 240 metric tons of cocaine travel through
the region every year (Kurtzleben 2009 p1). These figures are really a cause for alarm
because they are significantly more than the combined annual GDPs of several West
African states.
The severity and gigantic scale of the illicit trade is evidently manifested in the
significant number of cocaine and heroin seizures by drugs law enforcement agents in
many countries in West Africa in recent years.
First is Guinea Bissau, a country with an “annual GDP of $826 million in
2009” (cia.gov estimates 2009), but “in 2006 the country’s annual GDP was about
$384 million, or the equivalent of the street value of just six tons of cocaine
(Kurtzleben 2009, p1).” This seems to explain why Guinea Bissau has become the
first African narco-state (De Queiroz 2007 p1). A narco-state is “an area that has been
taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement

is effectively nonexistent (www.wordreference.com).” This former Portuguese colony
is the most glaring example of the increasing use of West Africa by Latin American
cocaine traffickers to get their wares into Europe. The country is wracked by poverty,
coups, and political unrest and has a coastline full of uninhabited islands; creeks and
swamps, providing the perfect cover for smugglers (Winter 2007, p1). Policing the
coast is a monumental challenge, “especially in the case of Guinea Bissau. Aircrafts
owned by Latin American cartels drop bundles of cocaine into the sea. Boats then
pick up the hauls and take them to Spain and Amsterdam (Chothia 2010, p4).” Three
recent incidents in Guinea Bissau illustrated how this country with no prisons is
vulnerable to the quick hit of drug money. In April 2007, an estimated 2.5 metric tons
of cocaine and heroin was flown into a military airstrip in Guinea Bissau. Two
soldiers were arrested with cars packed with 635kg of the drug, but the rest of the
shipment got through. A year earlier, 674kg of cocaine worth $39 million, or 13% of
the country’s total annual income, was found in the capital Bissau (Winter 2007, p1).
The BBC reported that the drugs were then safely kept in treasury vaults where they
disappeared. In 2005 some fishermen in Bissau discovered strange packets of white
powder floating in the sea. When word got out, traffickers showed up to buy back
what was left of their cargo (BBC 2005).
Furthermore, Latin American drug cartels have successfully penetrated all
strata of the Guinea Bissau government to the detriment of the country’s institutions
and poor citizens. According to the executive director of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa “drug cartels buy more than real
estate, banks and businesses. They buy elections, candidates, and parties. In a word,
they buy power (Destrebecq 2007).” The United States has already named Guinea
Bissau’s Air Force Chief Papa Camara and former Navy Chief, Jose Americo Bubo

Na Tchuto as drug kingpins. The two men were imposed with financial sanctions
under the US Drug Kingpin Act (Chothia 2010, p3), froze their US-controlled assets,
and prohibiting any United States citizen from having any economic transaction with
them. The head of the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, Adam Szubin
said Camara and Na Tchuto have played significant roles in international narcotics
trafficking (Ugah 2010, p1). In other words, since April 2010, when the sanctions
were imposed on the two men, people designated as drug traffickers and their
associates by the government of the United States control the Armed Forces of
Guinea Bissau. Bubo Na Tchuto later fled to The Gambia where he ran into troubles
with the authorities for alleged drug trafficking involvement.
According to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), “an
estimated 800-1000kg of cocaine is flown every night into Guinea Bissau and an
unspecified quantity is increasingly making its way by sea (Horta 2007, p2).”
The devastating influence of Latin American drug trade in Guinea Bissau
reached its peak when “the country’s President Joao Bernado Vieira was assassinated
by soldiers on March 1, 2009, barely hours after a bomb explosion had killed his rival
and Army Chief of Staff General Batista Tagme Na Waie (BBC 2009).” Many
political analysts in the region stated that the two late archrivals had different
allegiances to different Latin American drug cartels whose aim was to ignite political
chaos in the country so that they could transport their drugs through the lawless
country. Prior to the 2008 elections Tagme na Wai had accused Vieira of involvement
in drug trafficking (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p 243).
Furthermore, drug traffickers take advantage of the ineffective state of the
judicial system of Guinea Bissau. Judges in the country often complain that even if a
drug smuggler is captured, taken to court and convicted, they are often seen walking

the streets again within days (Winter 2007, p 3). A report on the phenomenon by
renowned Portuguese international analyst Ana Dias Cordeiro alleged that the shroud
of silence on drug trafficking in Guinea Bissau has included threats and pressure on
judges not to investigate people involved in the drug trade (De Queiroz 2007, p1).
In Guinea Conakry, the presidential guard of the late president Alpha Conte,
commanded by one of his sons, appeared to have been involved in drug trafficking
alongside a number of high ranking public security officials making use of diplomatic
pouches and passports to move drugs (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p244).”
Following the death of President Lansana Conte in late 2009, and a brief subsequent
military takeover of power, the late president’s two sons were arrested, and charged
with involvements in the drug trafficking (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p244).
After the disruptions in Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry, it appeared that
this hub had briefly relocated to The Gambia, the country where Bubo Na Tchuto had
fled. In March 2010, the president, Yahya Jammeh, ordered the arrest of eleven toplevel law enforcement officials in the country in connection with drug trafficking,
including the Director of the National Drug Enforcement Agency, his deputy and his
head of operations, the National Police Chief and his deputy, the chief of the navy the
deputy chief of the army, and the minister of fisheries (UNODC World Drug Report
2010 p 244).” In May of the same year “authorities in The Gambia announced that
they had seized two tons of cocaine with a street value estimated at $ 1 billion hidden
in a warehouse basement, an hour’s drive from the capital, Banjul (Doyle 2010, p1).”
According to the BBC, Gambian investigators were able to discover this “haul of
highly concentrated cocaine thanks to the help of the UK’s Serious Organized Crime
Agency (SOCA) — a rough equivalent of the US FBI.” After the seizure of this huge
quantity, Gambia’s President Yahya Jammeh threatened, “to wipe out drug trafficking

in the Gambia” and further stated that drugs bring “corruption, violence, indiscipline
and underdevelopment in a country (Fadera 2010, p1).”
Senegal has also had huge drug seizures in recent years. In June 2007,
Senegalese authorities announced the seizure of “a deserted empty sailing boat with
1.2 metric tons of cocaine on board. Few days later, Senegal made another seizure,
1.25 tons worth $100 million, its biggest ever (BBC 2007).”
In February 2010, Liberia’s Justice Minister Christian Tah publicly admitted
that drug trafficking was on the rise in the country (Dulleh 2010, p1). The Justice
minister gave a classic hypothesis of how poorly paid drug enforcement officers can
aid drug traffickers: “if you have a security patrolling the port that is paid a $100 a
month, then you have a problem because you will have drug smugglers who will give
him $5,000 to turn a blind eye” (Dulleh 2010, p1). Probably, the most notorious
linkages between illicit drugs and politics in Liberia had been former president
Charles Taylor’s wholesale endorsement of using the apparatus of the State to
enhance such trade (Aning 2010, p 6). According to Aning, Taylor was not just an
enabler of drug trafficking in his country, but was “supportive of granting banking
facilities to drug barons to launder their money (Aning 2010, p4).”
In Sierra Leone, “its vulnerability is credibly associated with the country’s
virtually unguarded airspace and coastline (Aning 2010, p6).” The fear that narcotics
are “one of the country’s biggest threats because of their capacity to corrupt the whole
of society, and weaken its institutions such as the security and judicial services are not
far-fetched. Until 2008, cocaine smuggling was not even banned in Sierra Leone.
However, “this changed when the minister of transportation resigned after his brother
was implicated in the country’s largest cocaine seizure (UNODC World Drug Report
2010, p243).”

Concluding thoughts
I argue that illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin can have a huge negative impact in
any country. These drugs have created turbulence in many countries. But what makes
the current West African situation unique is that the region had just recovered from
two brutal wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone that were caused by mineral resources.
Those two wars had destabilized the entire region during the last two decades. Due to
the lessons learned from the blood diamond trade, I argue that West Africa cannot
afford to be caught up in another economic, political and social catastrophe. I do
know that transnational illicit trafficking of drugs is a huge contemporary predicament
confronting the world, and it requires urgent transnational concerted efforts to fight
against it. Unfortunately, all indications are that if this new Latin American drug trade
phenomenon isn’t addressed appropriately sooner rather than later, the question may
not be if, but when turmoil besets the West African region, again. And I agree with
the statement by the UN Secretary-General at the 2010 African Union Summit in
January 2010, “drug trafficking was a rising threat to international peace and security
in Africa (UNODC World Drug Report 2010, p231).”

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
This research investigates the threat of the transnational trade in illicit drugs to
West Africa—particularly, Guinea Bissau—from a security and stability perspective.
I argue that the use of West Africa as a transit hub, by Latin American drug cartels
can negatively impact the security and stability of the sub-region. To put it simply:
Latin American drugs can politically destabilize West Africa. I am not suggesting that
as a consequence of the drug infiltration, West Africa will experience civil war, as
diamonds had plunged the sub-region into a chaotic political environment. Two brutal
civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are examples with spillover effects in
neighboring countries about two decades ago. Such an assertion would be hard to
defend, because in contemporary history, I have not yet come across any literature
that has linked the civil war of any West African state to drug activities. What I am
arguing in my thesis is that there is a very high chance that if the current trend in drug
infiltration continues, most countries, especially Guinea-Bissau, in the region will be
plunged into chaos and political instability because they do not have strong
institutions to deal with the infestation. In other words, the infiltration of the region by
Europe-bound illicit drugs from Latin America, coupled with the weak institutions in
most of the region’s sixteen countries will result in sustained political disorder. By
several indications, disorderly events witnessed in recent years in Guinea Bissau—a
former Portuguese colony and the country with the weakest institutions in the
region—seem to point to the direction of my predictions about the potential negative
political consequences of drugs in countries with weak institutions. However, as it’s
discussed later in this thesis, in European countries and the United States, where
institutions are relatively strong, illicit drug trade results in different set of negative

consequences that do not necessarily threaten the peace and stability in those
countries.
The drug scourge is a global phenomenon, and it is expanding at an alarming
rate. Today, drugs are a $US100 billion transnational industry (Flynn, 1993, p7).
Others have put the figure at $US500 billion. This whopping figure explains why
transnational illicit drug trade is estimated to be the second largest global business,
after the weapons trade. It is also the leading branch in transnational crime (Engvall
2006, p827). By many accounts, the West Africa-Latin America drug trade
phenomenon is a new variable in the region, and this explains the reason there isn’t
substantial literature available besides what has been documented in the public news
media.
However, while this phenomenon may be new to the West Africans, there are
some regions in other parts of the world, such as Central Asia, East Asia and South
America, which are no strangers to the infiltration of drugs and their consequences. In
order to better comprehend my prediction of the negative political consequences of
illicit drug trade, let’s take a relatively brief look at what some countries in the abovementioned regions had encountered as a result of the production, transportation or
smuggling, consumption and marketing of illicit drugs. Johan Engvall (2006) notes in
his article “The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in
Tajikistan,” that Central Asia has emerged as a major international hub for drugs
smuggled from supply areas in Asia to Russia and Europe. Engvall states that the
main factor for this development is that Afghanistan superseded Burma in the 1990s
as the world’s main producer of illicit opium. According to a 2005 report by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2005, p1), approximately 87%
of the world’s opium production took place in Afghanistan. The country most

severely affected by the escalating drug trade in the Central Asia region is Tajikistan,
a country especially attractive as a transit zone for drugs due to a combination of
factors. These factors include: (i) Tajikistan’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan
(a 1,206 kilometer mountainous Tajik-Afghan border); (ii) Tajikistan’s ethnic
connection with Afghanistan (Tajiks make up 20-25% of Afghanistan’s population);
and, (iii) since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has maintained Tajikistan
as its main military outpost in Central Asia (Engvall 2006, p 828). Johan Engvall
further states that drug trafficking networks have ramification throughout the Tajik
society. Drug money is inevitably present at the highest state level as it is a major
source of income in the country (Engvall 2006, p844). A World Bank report on
Tajikistan estimates that between 30 and 50% of the country’s economic activity is
linked to narcotics trafficking. Citing a 2001 report by the International Crisis Group,
the Brussels-based think-tank, Johan pointed out that the problem of drug money
corrupting the political system in Tajikistan exceeds that seen in other Central Asian
states because both the government and the opposition forces participated in the drug
trade during the civil war. And that is why local and Western experts have no doubt
that criminal interests are influencing the political system at the very highest level. In
sum, the relationship between Tajikistan and narcotics trade has had the following
consequences: (i) negative effects on both Tajikistan’s territory and population; (ii)
strained relations between Tajikistan and its neighbors especially Uzbekistan; (iii)
negative consequences on the health security of the country—dramatic rise in drug
addiction and HIV/AIDS; (iv) the criminalization and weakening of the state
machinery/institutions—which serves the interest of crime not the ordinary people.
The Tajikistan situation described above helps us understand the negative political
consequences that emanate from the relationship between illicit drug trade and weak

institutions in a country that is being used as transit hub by powerful drug cartels. The
factors that attract drug traffickers to used Tajikistan as a transit hub are quite similar
to those in West Africa, Guinea Bissau in particular. Moreover, the negative
consequences discussed above in Tajikistan are almost identical to the predictions that
my thesis is making about the West Africa drug phenomenon. That is why I am
arguing that there are lessons on the analysis on the cheapest, and that can be applied
more broadly.
Proceeding on the political consequences of narcotics in East Asia reveals
more about the political impact of narcotics in other parts of the world. According to
Alan Dupont (May/June 1999), the author of “Transnational Crime, Drugs, and
Security in East Asia,” the infamous Golden Triangle of Thailand, Burma and Laos is
the world’s largest producer of heroine. Dupont further states that in East Asia drug
money is distorting regional economies and exacerbating corruption and political
instability. Narcotic trafficking is now big business in East Asia. Alan reveals that
East Asia has metamorphosed from being once a primary producer of heroin to
become a major consumer of heroin and an emerging market for a new class of
designer drugs such as ice and ecstasy. The rise in illicit drug production and
trafficking in East Asia is due to several factors. First, North Korea’s disintegrating
economy and increasingly dysfunctional state apparatus have forced North Korean
diplomats to supplement their embassy finances by engaging in a range of welldocumented, government –sponsored criminal activities. Second, in Burma, the
diversification of heroin producers into amphetamine production can be seen as a
logical extension of existing narcotics trafficking by ethnic Chinese drug lords
responding to changing demand. Third, long period of sustained economic growth and
the establishment of world-class regional communication and transportation network

have facilitated the spread of illicit drugs in East Asia (Dupont 1999, pp 448-449). I
think Dupont’s first attribution of increased drug trade to a dysfunctional state
apparatus in North Korea consolidates the lessons learnt about the negative political
consequences often borne-out of the relationship between illicit drug trade and
countries that have weak institutions. Moreover, the fact that Dupont has also
attributed strong economies and advanced communications networks to the
flourishing of illicit drug trade highlight the negative consequences of a globalized
and technological advanced world those anti-global village proponents have often
predicted. The more globalized and technologically advanced our world is, the more
conducive grounds are created for the establishment of sophisticated organized crime
networks.
Furthermore, another country that has had its fair share of the negative
consequences of narcotics production, consumption, trafficking and marketing is the
South America nation of Colombia—the world’s largest producer and exporter of
cocaine and the second-largest supplier of heroin to the United States (Pardo 2000,
p64). In his piece “Domestic Implications of Illicit Colombian Drug Production and
Trafficking,” the author, Richard B. Craig (1983,p325) points out that Colombia
currently holds the dubious honor of being the world’s leading manufacturer of illicit
methaqualone. Consequently, Richard states, drugs have jeopardized the nation’s
electoral system, and corrupted or compromised political and judicial processes in
many local areas. According to the authors, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk (2001) in
their piece, “The Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
Implications for Regional Stability,” the current instability in Colombia derived from
the interaction and resulting synergies stemming from two distinct tendencies: the

development of an underground criminal drug economy and the growth of armed
challenges to the state’s authority (Rabasa, Chalk 2001).
This Latin America-West Africa drug trade is partly driven by the newly
intensified demand for cocaine in Western Europe, the shrinking of demand for
cocaine in the United States and the pressure on cocaine smuggling from interdiction
operations in the Caribbean (Felbab-Brown 2010, p1). Owing to these factors, the
drug trade has increased in the past five years so much so that this epidemic in West
Africa has created a frantic panic among academics, policy makers and security
experts on the potential negative effects on the political stability of the sub-region
The literature on the political consequences of illicit drugs in West Africa is
not well developed, but there is a huge credible amount of well researched and
developed literature on a similar resource, lootable resources, such as alluvial
diamonds, that I assume can be used as a lead-in to explain the potential destabilizing
consequences of drugs. The link between armed conflict and the production and
trafficking of illicit drugs has been frequently noted in the popular literature. Recent
academic research on the matter has taken place mainly within the framework of
studies of the role of natural resources in civil wars. These have tended to lump drugs
together with other lootable resources such as diamonds. However, the results have
been mixed.
By definition, and in the context of this thesis, I consider lootable resources as
natural resources especially mineral resources that are both valuable, easy to
transport, and have low economic barriers to entry. Lootable resources can easily be
extracted by any organization that is able to physically control where they are
produced (Burbank 2006, p1).

According to a research paper by Snyder and Bhavnani, empirical data showed
that the presence of diamonds is not always inherently associated with the occurrence
and prolongation of war. Even though alluvial diamonds have been labeled “blood
diamonds” and the “ultimate loot” due to atrocities in Sierra Leone, they are actually
more likely to be associated with peace than war. The majority of countries (60%)
that are significant producers of alluvial diamonds have not experienced civil wars
since the end of the cold war (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, p564). Even in Africa, the
region with perhaps the highest incidence of armed conflict since the end of the Cold
War, half of the continent’s ten significant producers of alluvial diamonds did not
have civil wars in this period (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, p564). I think this assertion
has neglected some other empirical data, which indicate that most diamond countries
have experienced conflict, especially the ones with lootable diamonds.
It’s undisputable that drugs and diamonds are quite different in many facets:
their mode of production, extraction, marketing, uses, and of course political
consequences. Legally, rulers can be publicly involved in the extraction and
marketing of lootable resources such as diamonds without any international
condemnation as long as they are abiding by the global standards set by the
international community in regards to activities related to lootable resources. One
such mechanism that had been successfully instituted by the international community
is called The Kimberly Process, which came into being following talks held in 2000 in
the South African town of Kimberly, for which the process is named after, by
international Non-Governmental Organizations (Burbank 2006,p2). Discussions were
made on the establishment of an international certificate of origin system to document
the path of rough diamonds from mine to polishing factory in order to prevent socalled “conflict diamonds” from entering the global market (Burbank 2006,p2).

Formally initiated in 2003, the Kimberly Process is a voluntary certification program
with 67 participating countries, including all the major producers and traders of rough
diamonds. The Kimberly Process requires its members to establish export and import
control regimes to document the path of rough diamonds from the time they are mined
or enter the country until they are exported. As part of this process, members are
encouraged to issue licenses to mines and to ensure that only licensed mines are
allowed to operate (Burbank 2006, p3). In her paper “The Effects of The Kimberly
Process on Governance, Corruption, and Internal Conflict (2006),” Joelle Burbank
reveals that diamonds from Kimberly Process participants now account for 99.8% of
the global production of rough diamonds. In contrast, there is nothing legal in the
production, transportation, marketing and usage of illicit drugs. As Snyder (2004)
notes rulers who earn revenue from illicit drugs risk international sanctions (Snyder
2004, p6). There is no internationally approved program similar to the Kimberly
Process in the illicit trade industry. Under international law illicit drugs are illegal.
In as much as I use the diamond-drug comparison, I am trying to explain a different
set of consequences. There is strong contemporary academic literature that
extrapolates on the consequences of alluvial diamonds, the sliding of the affected state
in to civil war and its prolongation. What explains the difference in the dependent
variable is the empirical data used by academic scholars in explaining their points and
defending their argument on the relationship between lootable resources and a state’s
political stability or instability. From my research there appears to be three contrasting
camps that explain this relationship. The first camp argues that the impact of lootable
resources in the order or disorder of a country depends on the strength or weakness of
its institutions. The second group of scholars argue that the presence of lootable
institutions weaken governments and their institutions. There is a third group that

argues that lootable resources do not cause war or political instability but prolongs it.
A fourth array of scholars argues that in fact it is war that causes the exploitation of
lootable resources.
The scholar Paul Collier is the most prominent political scientist in the camp
that argues that countries that have been destabilized by lootable resources did not
have strong institutions prior to the discovery of lootable resources in those territories.
In his World Bank-produced paper “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy” Collier (2003) argues, that, the fact that diamonds were critical
to the tremendous economic success of Botswana, but responsible for the social
catastrophe of Sierra Leone, accounts for the difference in institutional capacity. In
other words, Collier implies that the reason diamonds produced economic progress in
Botswana and civil war in Sierra Leone reflects difference in the strength of the
institutions. While the former had strong state institutions to manage her diamonds,
the latter had weak state institutions that were incapable of managing her diamonds.
Here, Collier emphasizes institutions. As part of the resource-conflict-weak-stronginstitutions argument, the author Michael L Ross makes a startling finding that
conveniently played into Collier’s case. In his piece “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
Ross (2001) notes that many of the poorest and most troubled states in the developing
world have high levels of natural resource wealth; that earlier studies have shown that
resource wealth tends to reduce economic growth, and to increase the likelihood of
civil war, there is actually a third component to the ‘resource curse’: authoritarian
rule. Authoritarian governments, Ross opines, may be less able to resolve domestic
conflicts and hence more likely to suffer from civil war. Slow growth may make
domestic unrest tougher to resolve; civil wars, in turn, wreak economic havoc. There
is nothing inevitable about the resource curse: states like Malaysia, Chile, and

Botswana have done relatively well despite their oil and mineral wealth. Yet most
others have found—like King Midas—that their resource wealth can be an
unexpected source of grief (Ross 2001, p357). As Ross (2001) finds states with large
resource sectors tend to have lower education rates, which Collier and Hoeffler (2002)
contend boosts the risk of civil war. In another piece written in 2003, titled “Oil,
Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil Wars,” Ross
argues that the degree to which a commodity is linked to conflict depends on three
things: its lootability, obstructability and legality. Drugs, like diamonds, Ross argues,
are easy for limited number of individuals to appropriate and transport to markets, as
opposed to oil, gas, timber or minerals. Given their high value-to-size ratio, they are
not easily obstructable, unlike oil, minerals and timber, which require much more
time and complicated enterprises to be looted.
However, the Collier camp’s argument solidly contrasts to that made by an
array of scholars who argue that lootable resources weaken strong state institutions,
thus making the state susceptible to political destabilization. In their piece “A
Diamond Curse? Civil War and Lootable Resource,” Paivil Lujala, Nils Petter
Gleditsch and Elizabeth Gilmore (2005) argued that Collier’s two-country
comparison is “oversimplified,” since Sierra Leone’s diamonds are secondary
(lootable) while Botswana has primary (non-lootable) deposits. Primary diamonds
occur in underground rock formations and are often mined by large multinational
corporations that are able to bear the investment costs and risk involved in
underground diamond mining. By contrast, secondary diamonds are easier to find and
can be exploited with artisanal tools such as shovel and a sieve. In addition, the
dispersal of diamonds from their primary source is generally accompanied by an
increase in the average value per carat, as the erosion destroys the flawed stones.

Therefore Lujala et al (2005), argue that the problem lies on the type of diamonds
found in a particular country, not its institutions. This explains the evidence that
supports the fact that secondary diamonds are positively related to the incidence of
civil war, especially in countries divided along ethnic lines. On the other hand,
primary diamonds make ethnic war onset and incidence less likely (Lujala, Gleditsch
and Gilmore 2005, p538). According to Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, an abundance
of natural resources tends to be associated, among other things, to the deterioration of
institutions of governance, which in turn may increase the risk of conflict.
While Lujala et al’s (2005) case is robust, I concur with Collier’s (2003)
argument that states with strong institutions do not necessarily suffer from the
negative consequences of lootable resources like diamonds. I believe that, it is highly
likely that strong institutions anywhere in the world can be trusted for their
effectiveness and efficiency in their operations. For instance, let’s take a look at the
role of institutions or the difference they make in resource-rich countries in the
context of illicit drugs in the Western countries. Despite the ubiquitousness of illicit
drugs in many western countries (USA and Europe), we have yet to see or may never
even witness those countries descend to civil war as a consequence of the drugs
littered in their cities. My take is that the reason for the huge difference is that
Western countries have strong state institutions that can effectively and efficiently
enforce drug control laws and prosecute those apprehended for drug trafficking and
consumption. However, it would be academically false to claim that illicit drugs have
not created daunting problems for the Western countries. Illicit drugs have indeed
produced huge levels of conflict, criminality and incarceration in the West. For
example in 2008, 1.5 million Americans were arrested for drug offences and 500,000
of them were imprisoned (Will 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2009/10/28/AR2009102803801.html). And in Europe, the
statistics on the consequences of illicit drugs look grim. My point is that the set of
negative consequences of illicit drugs one witnesses in the West are different from the
huge political repercussions associated with the transnational drug trade in West
Africa. The question is simple: Why? My hypothesis is that in Western countries
illicit drugs produce a different set of consequences than those experienced in Africa
because of the difference in the capacities in their institutions.
The role both strong and weak state institutions play in the onset of conflicts in
resource-rich countries have also been argued by Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani
(2005) in their paper “Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework
for Explaining Political Order.” Snyder et al (2005) argued, that, in countries rich in
lootable resources like alluvial diamonds, precious hard wood, and illegal drugs, the
ability of their leaders to achieve and maintain political order depends on three things:
(1) the availability of non-lootable resources as a source of revenue;
(2) the mode of extraction of lootable resources especially whether they are extracted
by hard-to-tax artisans or, alternatively, by large, taxable industrial firms; and
(3) patterns of state spending—in particular whether rulers consume revenue
frivolously or invest it in strengthening the military, providing social welfare, and
improving their capacity to earn revenue in the future. For example, Snyder et al
(2005) pointed out, in Sierra Leone (former president Joseph) Momoh’s failure to
maintain the industrial mode of diamond extraction bequeathed by his predecessor,
(Siaka) Stevens, was partly a function of the growing coercive power of private
resource holders (for example, the Lebanese diamond traders), a factor that may itself
have been a direct cause of the country’s collapse into civil war. To put it bluntly, the
decay of Sierra Leone’s institutions under Stevens’ chosen successor Joseph Momoh

presidency, between 1985 and 1992, deprived the government of revenue, caused a
deep fiscal crisis that rendered the state vulnerable to collapse, and made an important
source of income –diamonds— more readily available to rebels. To put simply, Sierra
Leone experienced the negative consequences of diamonds through a brutal civil war
because there were no robust state institutions that could industrialize its alluvial
diamonds deposits that could have been taxed, and the proceeds could have been used
for the welfare of her people. However, in the absence of the state institutions to
manage the nation’s resources, the Sierra Leonean people resorted in a competitive
artisan-non-taxable mode of extraction that resulted in the fierce and brutal struggle
for diamonds. Richard Snyder expanded more on this in his July 2004 piece titled,
“Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction
Framework.” In this working paper Snyder states that if rulers are able to forge
institutions of extraction that give them control over the revenues generated by
lootable resources, these resources can actually contribute to the maintenance of order
by providing the income with which to govern. Without it, Snyder (2004) continues,
the breakdown or absence of such institutions can produce instability in two ways:
first, by causing a fiscal crisis of the incumbent regime that renders it vulnerable to
collapse and, second, by making it easier for rebels to organize and gain access to
income. The scholar Macartan Humphreys (2005) agrees with Snyder et al’s (2005)
analysis that weakened state institutions that could not industrialize the diamonds
mode of extraction in Sierra Leone pushed the country into civil war.
In his paper titled “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution:
Uncovering the Mechanism,” Humphreys (2005) states that Sierra Leone was
“vulnerable not simply because it had gems but because it had not gone through a

process of industrialization and held within its clusters of rural communities with
relatively weak commercial ties” between them.
Furthermore, in the article “Natural Resources: A source of conflict?” by
scholars Charles-Philippe David and Jean-Francois Gagne the authors argue that
resource-based conflicts are more likely to occur in impoverished societies governed,
if at all, by very weak postcolonial regimes which are dependent on export revenues
from one or a few natural resources. I think this argument is consistent with the weak
state institutions explanation discussed above.
There are many political scientists who have argued that lootable resources do
not create conflict but contribute to its prolongation. Michael L. Ross (2004) states in
his paper “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” that
gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis do not seem to be linked to the initiation of
conflict, but they do seem to lengthen pre-existing wars. Ross (2004) strengthened his
argument by mentioning high profile conflicts in the 1990s in Angola, Colombia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia where the continuation of those conflicts
was credibly linked to the presence of resources such as diamonds and illicit drugs.
Ross (2004) further notes that states that depend heavily on the export of oil,
gemstones, and minerals tend to suffer from a variety of problems including: slow
economic growth, high poverty rates, high corruption levels and authoritarian
governance. Ross states that countries with large resource exports tend to tax their
population less heavily which impedes democracy because low tax revenues weaken
states. Ross’s argument is bolstered by the scholar Svante E. Cornell (2005), who
notes that recent academic research show that drugs are not linked to the onset of
conflict but appear to be linked to the duration of conflict. However, he cautions, in
his article “The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflicts,” that the causal mechanism of

the linkage between narcotics and conflict remains poorly understood. Cornell (2005)
notes that empirical cases indicate that where a pre-existing drug production exists,
the conditions of armed conflict boost narcotic production and enable insurgents to
become involved in the drug trade to finance their struggle, thereby increasing their
capabilities and the challenge they pose to states. In some cases, Cornell further
argues, involvement in the drug trade also seems to affect the motivational structures
of insurgent groups, creating an economic function of war and the vested interests in
the continuation of armed conflict. In their piece titled “Oil and War in Angola”
Jedrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, argued that mineral wealth has not only
financed Angola’s war but has also intimately shaped the contours of the conflict. The
Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola’s (MPLA) access to oil revenues and
the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola’s (UNITA) to diamonds
can help to explain the duration and character of the conflict, and, to some extent,
even the timing of military operations (Frynas and Wood 2001, p587). The
dependence on lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, gems, drugs, or timber,
affects the duration of conflict (David and Gagne 2006/2007, p16).
Moreover, there are some scholars who argue that in fact the advent of war
leads to the exploitation of resources. One such academic is Ingrid Samset. In her
piece, “Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC,”
she argues that the persistence of conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) all seemed to be connected in various ways to
the exploitation of valuable natural resources in these countries. War, Samset argues,
does not only enhance the exploitation of resources but also diverts it. For over three
years, she argued, the Congolese war had facilitated and reinforced diversion of
natural resources beyond Congolese control. Samset reveals that while the total

wartime looting is estimated at 5 percent of the Congo’s GDP, calculations show that
in the MbujiMayi region, where the DRC alliance partners have their key concessions,
roughly 20 percent of exports yield no local benefit. The corresponding diversion for
coltan in the eastern areas, where Rwandan and Ugandan contingents dominate, is 50
percent (Samset 2002, p477). Samset concludes that war facilitates excessive resource
exploitation that spurs continued fighting, and in the DRC case resource exploitation
had been linked to triggering and prolonging the armed conflict.
As has been argued above, the infiltration of drugs into a country has often led
to internal political destabilization, example Colombia and Tajikistan. In GuineaBissau, where the Latin American narcotics trade has pierced through all strata of the
mini West African state’s institutions and society a similar political environment has
already emerged. Unlike rebels in diamond-rich countries, drug dealers may be not
interested in seizing political power. They are usually interested in weakening state
institutions (where they exist) that otherwise would dampen down their activities, so
as to engage in their clandestine economic enterprise. They achieve this objective by
employing several means, which include corrupting law enforcement officials, bribing
the judicial systems, and patronizing influential political figures to the highest levels
of authority. Strong state institutions make that impossible. By contrast, in most
conflicts in diamond-rich countries, strong institutions put a mechanism that enhances
the extraction, transportation, and marketing of those resources so that the state
derives revenue for the benefit of the population. In short, strong institutions curtail
drug activities, but advance the extraction and marketing of diamonds.
The issue here is that the Latin American illicit drug trade through West
Africa creates huge political negatives consequence in the sub-region.

Institutional Concepts
In the earlier part of this chapter I dissected the compelling arguments made
by various scholars on the relationship between lootable resources such as alluvial
diamonds and illicit drugs, and their implications on the political stability of a
country. The positions taken by two opposite camps seem to be the most relevant in
the debate over the impact of lootable resources on state political institutions. The first
group of scholars has argued that lootable resources weaken strong state institutions
thus rendering the state to be vulnerable to political upheaval. The second group has
argued that in fact any state that has descended into political disorder due to lootable
resources had no strong institutions prior to the intrusion or discovery of those
resources. In other words, states with strong institutions do not bear the brunt of the
negative consequences of lootable resources like diamonds and drugs.
There is little doubt that the debate has been broad on the political
consequences of the lootable resources on the stability or instability of a country,
especially in Third World countries. However, I am of the conviction that a few
important components have been missing in the contemporary debate about illicit
drugs and state institutions. First, what are strong institutions? What are the
characteristics of strong state institutions? How does one measure the strength and/or
weakness of state institutions? Second, what are illicit drugs, and how does one
define them? Since illicit drugs are an underground trade, how does one measure
them? What are the negative consequences credibly associated with the relationship
between strong state institutions and illicit drug trade?
Here I discuss what I mean by strong state institutions, and describe the
yardstick for measuring a strong state institution. I will also explain what I mean by
illicit drug trade and how it is measured. Furthermore, in this chapter I will also

generally discuss the negative implications of the relationship between illicit drug
trade and state institutions by contextualizing the Guinea Bissau conundrum.
However, I must state that I will not be inventing new ways of measuring strong state
institutions, illicit drug trade and the impact of the relationship between the two.
How exactly can illicit drug trafficking pose a threat to stability? According to
the UNODC World Drug Report 2010, there are two ways that illicit drug trafficking
can pose a threat to the stability of a country. The first involves countries where
insurgents and illegal armed groups draw funds from taxing, or even managing, drug
production and trafficking.” The “second concerns countries that do not face such a
situation, but where the illicit drug traffickers become powerful enough to take on the
state through violent confrontation, high-level corruption, or (usually) both (UNODC
World Drug Report 2010, p231).”
It is common knowledge that drug trafficking is problematic for any country it
touches, but it can become particularly destabilizing where there are pre-existing
governance issues. The most significant of those pre-existing governance issues are
state political institutions that are either relatively weak or strong.
For the purpose of this research, I am embracing the definitions of political
institutions as humanly devised rules and procedures—both for formal and informal—
that constrain and enable political behavior (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009, p117). Since
politics is ubiquitous or that it’s deeply embedded in our lives, as many political
scientists like to say, I think it is fair to say that state political institutions affect every
aspect of today’s society. Having briefly defined state political institutions let me
move onto to the next question: what are the characteristics of strong institutions?

Characteristics of institutional strengths

In their piece, “Institutional Strength, Social Control and Neighborhood
Crime Rates” the scholars Ruth A. Triplett, Randy R. Gainey and Ivan Y. Sun (2003),
state that based on the sociological literature on institutions, institutional strength is
best defined in terms of four characteristics: stability, resources, clear rules and
statuses, and interconnections. The first characteristic defining institutional strength,
stability, refers not only to the lack of change but also to the ability of the institution
to function in the face of change through maintenance of institutional structures and
roles. The second characteristic defining institutional strength is the level of resources
embedded in, or capable of emerging from, an institution and its activities. The third
important characteristic defining institutional strength is a clear delineation of roles
and statuses. A final characteristic indicative of institutional strength is
interconnectedness which deals with linking structures and functions found between
institutions both within and across the private, parochial and public levels (Triplett,
Gainey and Sun, 2003 pp443-459).

The results of institutional weakness
Triplett et al (2003) further note, “there are four main reasons for predicting
that weak institutions diminish national levels of social control at the private and
parochial levels. First, weak institutions do not provide stability that is needed for
effective informal social control to develop. Second, weak institutions a nation’s
access to the resources needed to enact effective informal social control. Third, weak
institutions are less effective at informal social control because they are less able to
provide guides for behavior. Finally, institutions, like social networks, are structures
within which individuals interact, connecting to each other and to the society to which
they are a part. Weak institutions are unable to provide the structures for effective

interaction, thus affecting the development of social networks and their ability to
serve in a capacity of social control (Triplett, Gainey and Sun 2003, pp448-449).”
In their paper “Variation in Institutional Strength,” the scholars Steven
Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo (2009) assert, “many formal institutions in
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the former Soviet Union are neither minimally stable
nor regularly enforced. In other words, instead of taking root and generating shared
behavioral expectations, formal rules are widely contested, routinely violated, and
frequently changed (Levitsky and Murillo 2009, p116).”

The concept of institutional strength in terms of enforcement and stability
Levitsky et al (2009) theorizes that “institutional strength may be
conceptualized along two dimensions: enforcement and stability. Enforcement is the
degree to which parchment rules are complied with in practice. Where all relevant
actors in a given territory routinely comply with parchment rules or face a high risk of
punishment, enforcement is high. By stability, we mean durability. Institutions are
stable to the degree that they survive not only the passage of time but also changes in
the conditions—i.e. , underlying power and preference distributions— under which
they were initially created and reproduced . Institutional instability must be
distinguished from normal institutional change. Because even the most robust rules
evolve, one or more instances of institutional change cannot necessarily be taken as an
indicator of instability. Rather, institutional instability is best understood as a pattern
in which, given a common environment (i.e. exogenous shocks, changes in power and
preference distribution), a particular institutional arrangement changes with greater
frequency than other similarly designed ones (Levitsky and Murillo 2009, p117).”

From the discussion, above, on the characteristics of institutional strength, I
shall state that the main feature that stands out is the “stability” of an institution. As
we shall see later, stability is one characteristic that many countries lack in West
Africa, particularly Guinea-Bissau. As an indigene of the region, I can attest to the
fact that most institutions in West African countries have not survive the passage of
time and the occurrence of change, either in the form of military takeover, change of
government through democratic elections or other economic situations.
To further facilitate the comprehension of the two dimensions of institutional strength
refer to the table below that I reproduced from Levitsky and Murillo (2009):
TABLE

………………………………………………………………………..
Enforcement
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……
High
Low
…......................................................................................................................................
......
High

Strong formal institutions

stable (but weakly enforced)
formal institutions

Stability
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……
Unstable (but enforced)
weak formal institutions
formal institutions
..…………………………………………………………………………………………
…..
Low

Here is how Levitsky and Murillo (2009) explain the table above:
“Enforcement and stability do not necessarily vary together. As the table above

shows, the two dimensions may be combined to produce four distinct types. The
upper left quadrant corresponds to strong institutions, or those that are both stable and
enforced. It is these pure cases of institutional strength—characterized by a tight
coupling between formal rules and actual behavior— that predominate in most of the
theories of institutions generated by studies of advanced industrialized democracies.
However, institutional strength is not the exclusive characteristic of established
democracies. The lower left quadrant in the table above corresponds to institutions
that are enforced but unstable. In such cases, parchment rules are widely followed, but
they are modified with comparatively high frequency, such that actors are unable to
develop shared expectations on past behavior. The upper right quadrant corresponds
to formal institutions that are stable but not enforced. In other words, rules remain on
the books for long periods of time but are routinely ignored, serving, in effect, as
window dressing. Frequently in such cases, actors adhere to established informal rules
of the game. Finally, the lower right quadrant of the table above corresponds to
institutions that are neither stable nor regularly enforced. Here the coupling between
formal rules and actual behavior is very loose. Rules exist on parchment, but in
practice, they do little to constrain actors or shape their expectations (Levitsky and
Murillo 2009, pp117-118).”
Based on the facts discussed later in this chapter, I believe that the institutional
situation in West Africa, particularly Guinea Bissau, is very much summed up in the
lower right quadrant of the table above. To put it simply, it is a situation where
stability of institutions is at its lowest points, and there is a total absence of the
enforcement of the rule of law.

Defining and measuring illicit drugs

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) uses the term illicit
drugs to describe “drugs which are either under international control— and which
may or may not have licit medical purposes— but which are produced, trafficked
and/or consumed illicitly.”
It is common knowledge and obvious that drugs change the way the body and
brain function. And sometimes the changes can be pleasant in the case of prescription
medications by treating diseases. However, sometimes the changes are monstrous and
cause great harm to the human body and well-being. While I recognize the fact that
the consumption of some licit/legal drugs can be harmful to the human being, I shall
state that most drugs that have negative consequences in the human body are illicit
drugs. t The “main illicit drugs are the opiates, mostly heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and
ATS (amphetamine-type stimulants) such as amphetamines, methamphetamine and
ecstasy (Shah 2008, p2).”
Among the group of drugs that devastate the human body and brain are heroin
and cocaine whose trafficking political implications in West Africa, particularly
Guinea Bissau, are the focus of my research.
I am aware that illicit drugs are a problem for the economies of all the countries they
affect. I agree, “size is one of the determinants of an illegal activity’s effects on a
country (Thoumi 2009, p 109).” I think they are a problem primarily because they are
an underground business that usually escapes the radar of measurement of most
countries. However, despite these obstacles, I think some form of measurement is
needed for several reasons: for drug policy formulation; negative effects on the legal
market or economies; and of course political implications on the institutions of states
where they are trafficked and traded.

The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) which is usually the
official source of estimates of this illicit trade reveal that the “current value of
international drug trade account for approximately 8% of the international trade
(UNDCP 1997, p.124).” Contextually, this means that “in 1994, this figure would
have been larger than the international trade in iron and steel, and motor vehicles, and
about the same size as the total international trade in textiles (UNDCP 1997, p.124).”
As estimated by the UN, the “heroine figure is a little more than a quarter of the total
for all world drug sales (Reuter and Greenfield 2001, p160).”
However, I am compelled to state that numbers or figures that represent an
estimation of any product may be subjected to exaggeration and misrepresentation.
According to Reuter and Greenfield (2001), the global drug markets are so large and
secretive that the official estimates are without doubt highly exaggerated, because the
underlying data that give rise to estimates of global drug markets are riddled with
discrepancies and inconsistencies. For instance, in his piece, “The Measurement of
Illegal Drug Markets: The Implications of its Irrelevance” (publication date
unknown) the author Peter Reuter argue that “the numbers about illegal drugs market
in the US are in fact just decorations on the policy, rhetorical conveniences for
official statements without any serious consequences.” I need to make two points
here. First, I do not agree with this criticism, because while I agree that drug figures
have mostly been estimates anti-drug policy makers’ inaction due to lack of factual
drug figures won’t help in the war against drugs. I believe any figure, no matter how
inaccurate they are, will be more helpful than not coming up any numbers at all.
Second, my research have proven that the increasing rate of illicit drug trafficking,
coupled with weak institutions, have negative political consequences in West Africa,
and Guinea-Bissau in particular. While I value accuracy in numbers, I shall argue that

it does not matter much in the Guinea-Bissau scenario. The fact remains that illicit
drug trafficking has been on the rise in the region, and the negative political
consequences are unarguably troubling.

Relationship between Guinea Bissau’s weak institutions and illicit drugs, and
consequences
I believe that Guinea Bissau’s state institutions are not characterized by any of
the features of strong institutions discussed above. Rather, I shall argue that all the
features of weak institutions define them. The country’s institutions lack stability;
they also lack resources to operate; there is no clear delineation of roles and status
especially between the army and the police force; there is a total lack of
interconnectedness between the various so-called structure and institutions; and
enforcement of the rule of law is at its lowest point, and in some instances totally
absent.
The negative consequence of the relationship between institutions and illicit
drugs is evidently clear in the Guinea Bissau situation. Guinea Bissau “is one of the
ten poorest nations in the world. The former Portuguese colony gained its
independence in 1975 after thirteen years of brutal guerilla war against the Portuguese
colonial army (Horta 2007, p1).” During the next two decades the “country was ruled
by one-party dictatorships which resulted in the two year civil war between 1998 and
2000 (Horta 2007, p1).” As a consequence of these wars and continued instability
most of the state’s institutions have either collapsed or non-existent. “The judicial
system is non-existent with judges and other legal staff being paid miserably. Most of
the infrastructure such as court buildings and prison still lie in ruins. The country’s

police and gendarmerie force as an institution is so dysfunctional that it is unable to
impose law in only the capital (Horta 2007, p1).” “The judicial police for example,
have sixty agents, one vehicle and often not fuel. As a result when culprits are
apprehended they are driven in a taxi to the police station (Bybee 2009, p6).” “The
army which is plagued by internal strife and personal and tribal loyalties is more a
collection of various warlords than a real national military institution (Horta 2007,
pp2).” Also, the military has “one rusty ship that patrols the 350 kilometer coastline
and the country’s 88-unpoliced islands (Bybee 2009, p10).” “With the country’s
economy in tartars the government is often unable to pay public servants, and as of
2006 the country relied on foreign aid to cover over 90 percent of its state’s budget
needs (Horta 2007, p1).”
Given the facts discussed above, it can be argued that “a state with no ability
to protect its territory, a struggling economy, no police force and an overbearing and
corrupt military is the ideal place for narco traffickers and other criminal elements to
run their illicit activities (Horta 2007, pp1-3).” In other words, it is a state with no
strong institutions. And that’s exactly what the situation is in Guinea Bissau.
Due to Guinea Bissau’s weak institutions “the drug trade and the profits it brings to
those willing to associate with has led to the culture of violence and intimidation
among the security services and the elites (Horta 2007, p2).” For instance, there had
been dramatic situations where violence had erupted among the different sectors of
the security apparatus.
Moreover, Guinea-Bissau’s weak institutions’ inability to address the drug
scourge resulted in a “risk of secession of some parts of the country. Most of the
cocaine from Latin America enters the country from its southern provinces with its
numerous waterways and dense jungles. The large profits going into the pockets of

corrupt military commanders and local officials are greatly increasing their power
base while decreasing the influence of an already weak and impoverished
government. The provinces of Guinara, Tomball, and the archipelago province of
Bolama are the most vulnerable to possible secession (Horta 2007, p2). I think it is
not a far-fetched prediction that a situation may arise where “local military
commanders are empowered by narco dollars and make use of tribal loyalties, thus
becoming the de facto rulers of mini narco states (Horta 2007, p2).”
It’s worth noting that Guinea Bissau’s problems have already spilled into
neighboring countries like Senegal, Guinea Conakry, Gambia, Mali, and Mauritania.
It is often argued that countries with weak and small economies and prolonged
instability have troubling asserting authority over their sovereign territory. And it is
no secret that “West Africa has many countries that are poor and unstable. This
situation among others seems to explain why the United Nations has come to
recognize the relationship between political stability and organized crime” (UNODC
World Drug Report 2010, p231). In his March 2005 report titled “In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” the United Nations
Secretary General concluded that organized crime contributes to state weakness,
impedes economic growth, fuels many civil wars, regularly undermines United
Nations peace building efforts and provides financing mechanisms to terrorist groups.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN
The data analyzed in this chapter is obtained from highly credible sources. The
sources are the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transparency
International, and the Fund for Peace.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I will
provide data obtained from the UNODC that shows changes in the flow of illicit drugs
from Latin American countries to countries in West Africa, particularly Guinea
Bissau. I will measure that data by using mathematical figures such as pie charts and
tables that will clearly demonstrate when, how and where there has been an increase
in the illicit drug trade in West African countries. I will also measure data that

indicate drug flow increase by relying on annual figures on drug production and
seizures published by the UNODC from 2000 to 2008. As will be seen later, these
figures have shown a dramatic increase in the production and transportation of illicit
Latin American drugs through West Africa from 2000 to 2008.
In the second section, I will provide data on the strength and/or weakness of
state institutions in West African countries, particularly Guinea Bissau. I will measure
this data by comparing the political stability, as a consequence of strong state
institutions in West Africa prior to the illicit drug infiltration, with the political
stability, in the same countries, after the spotting of the incursion of Latin American
illicit drugs. I will measure institutional strength by focusing on what I think is the
most important variable in the region: corruption. I will rely on Transparency
International’s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). I think that corruption is in
many respects an inherent feature of weak state institutions that drug cartels have
smartly exploited in all levels of society and government, by paying politicians,
judges (O’Regan 2010,p3) and security personnel to look the other way, thus the rise
in drug trade and subsequent political instability.
In the third section of this chapter, I will make available data on the instability in the
region due to the increased illicit drug flows under conditions of weak state
institutions in West African countries, especially Guinea Bissau. Measuring these
consequences will involve the discussion of the political upheavals, assassinations,
dwindling living standards, increased drug-related crime rates, and rigged
electioneering processes that are all attributable to the increased presence of Latin
American illicit drugs in West Africa, especially Guinea Bissau. In summary, I will
show how all those factors have created to fail or unstable states in the region, by

relying on the Failed States Index Scores published annually by the Washington-DC
based Fund for Peace.

Data on increased illicit drug flow and measuring it
Figure 1: National shares of global potential cocaine production in 2007
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Data source: UNODC World Drug Report 2008

The pie chart above shows the 2007 global cocaine production of three Latin
American nations: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. I must note that these countries have
also been the main sources of almost all Europe-bound cocaine seized in West
African nations in recent years. The pie chart shows that 61 percent of global
production came from Colombia, 29 percent from Peru and 10 percent from Bolivia.
In other words, according to the pie chart, the entire global production of cocaine is
done in these three countries, all of which have a close geographical proximity to all
countries in West Africa, whose state institutions are weak.

Table 1: Annual Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000—2007

Year

Quantity seized in Kilograms

2000

97

2001

268

2002

95

2003

266

2004

1,788

2005

1,323

2006

3,161

2007

6,458

Data source: UNODC World Drug Report 2007.

The table above provides data about the trend of cocaine seizures in West
Africa from 2000 to 2007. I must concede that recorded quantities of seized drugs
may not give us the accurate figure on drug that passes through the region to Europe
annually. However, I believe one way of reading the increased quantities of seized
drugs is that, drug trafficking has also increased. I believe that large quantities of drug
seizures correspond with increased drug flow. The table above has led me to make
this conclusion: drug flow in the region has been skyrocketing year in and year out,
under the conditions of weak state institutions in almost all states in West Africa over
the last decade. In 2000, only 97 kilograms of cocaine were reported seized in the
whole region. Four years later, 1,788 kilograms were seized, and in 2006 that number
had almost doubled. And as recent as 2007, 6,458 kilograms of cocaine were reported
intercepted and seized in West Africa.

Data on strength of state institutions and how to measure it
There can be various ways to measure the strength of institutions. But I
believe the most reliable mode of measuring state institutional strength is to determine
the level of corruption in a country. It is my belief that strong institutions are usually
resistant to the temptation and culture of corruption, while weak institutions such as
those in West African states are highly susceptible to an ingrained culture of
corruption piercing through the highest level of government: the executive, legislative
and judiciary branches. This is why I examined and measured the data shown below
on the level of corruption in West African states as evidence of weak institutions
which has increased the illicit drug trafficking thus posing the risk of regional
instability
Table 2: West African countries Transparency International’s CPI ranking and scores.
Country

World Ranking

Score

Cape Verde

45

5.1

Ghana

62

4.1

Liberia

87

3.3

The Gambia

91

3.2

Burkina Faso

98

3.1

Senegal

105

2.9

Benin

110

2.8

Mali

116

2.7

Niger

123

2.6

Nigeria

134

2.4

Sierra Leone

134

2.4

Togo

134

2.4

Mauritania

143

2.3

Ivory Coast

146

2.2

Guinea Bissau

154

2.1

Guinea Conakry

164

2.0

Data Source: Transparency International CPI 2010. Table format: my idea

The table above shows the world rankings and scores of all the sixteen
countries in West Africa out of 178 countries globally in the Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index 2010. Scores were allocated ranging from
“10” which means highly clean or least corrupt to “0” which represents highly
corrupt. In other words, the closer a country’s score is to “10” the less corrupt it has,
while the closer a country’s score is to “0” the more corrupt that country is. Also, the
higher a country’s ranking number is the more corrupt it is , while the lower a
country’s ranking number is the least corruption that country experiences. Out of the
178 countries polled only one West African state (Cape Verde, score 5.1, rank 45)
made it to the first fifty less corrupt countries in the world. Fifteen of the sixteen West
African states could not even score half the range, which is 5.0. Only five West
African countries (Cape Verde 45, Ghana 62, Liberia 87, The Gambia 91 and Burkina
Faso 98) were ranked in the first one hundred countries in the world. All the
remaining eleven West African countries were ranked above the 100th position. The
countries of Guinea Bissau (rank 154, score 2.1) — the focus of my thesis, and
neighboring Guinea Conakry (rank 164, score 2.0) are among the twenty-fourth and
fourteenth (respectively) most corrupt nations on the face of the earth. Both countries

are closely behind Ivory Coast (rank 146, score 2.2) Mauritania (rank 143, score 2.3),
while Togo, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in a tie (rank 134, score 2.4).
The 2010 CPI tied Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore at the apex of the
list with a score of 9.3, while Somalia is at the bottom of the list with rank 178 and
score 1.1. What this means is that Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore are the least
corrupt countries in the world, whereas Somalia is the most corrupt on this planet.
A look at the previous Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) between 2004 and 2009 has shown a similar pattern in ranks and scores
for almost all West African states: that they are among the most corrupt countries in
the world.
In 2004, out of 146 countries polled no West African made it to the top fifty
less corrupt. The best rank for the region came from Ghana, which made it to the
miserable position of 64, while Nigeria, the region’s powerhouse, was the 144th
corrupt country in the world.
In 2007, with the exception of Cape Verde (rank 49, score 4.9) all West
African countries were among the most corrupt states in the world. In the same
Guinea Bissau was the world’s 147th most corrupt country with a score of 2.2.
In the 2008 CPI ranking of 180 countries Guinea Bissau was the world’s 158th
corrupt state. Again, with the exception of Cape Verde (ranked 47, score 5.1) no West
African state ranked the first fifty least corrupt.
The corruption level did not improve in 2009 either. Out of the 180 polled in
2009 by TI’s CPI, Guinea-Bissau ranked as the world 162nd corrupt in the world. The
rest of the countries in the region with the usual exception of Cape Verde (rank 46,
score 5.1) were pathetically among the worst corrupt countries in the world.

I, therefore, argue that based on the entrenched culture of massive corruption,
West Africa’s state institutions are among the weakest in the world, dating back to
2004 when Latin American illicit drug incursions were first spotted.

Consequences of increased illicit drug flow under weak state institutions
The increased illicit drug flow under the conditions of weak institutions has resulted
in the instability of the region through failed states. I am of the view that all failed
states are unstable states. And West Africa has a lot of them.
Here is how to read the Failed States Index Scores: the lower the rank number of a
country, the more unstable/failed state it is, while the higher a country’s rank number,
the more stable the state is. In other words, the most unstable countries are at the top
of the list, and the most stable ones are at the bottom of the list.
The Index determines a state’s instability based on the accumulation of scores
(ranging from “0” which represents excellent rating to “10” meaning worst rating) on
the following issues: demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced
persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven economic development, economic
decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security
apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention.

Table 3: Failed States Index Scores 2010: West African country ranking and score

Country

Global Rank

Total Score

Guinea Conakry

9

105.0

Ivory Coast

12

101.2

Nigeria

14

100.2

Niger

19

97.8

Guinea Bissau

22

97.2

Sierra Leone

28

93.6

Liberia

33

91.7

Burkina Faso

35

90.7

Mauritania

39

89.1

Togo

47

88.1

The Gambia

75

80.2

Mali

78

79.3

Cape Verde

88

77.2

Benin

93

76.8

Senegal

99

74.6

Ghana

122

67.1

Data source: Fund for Peace Failed States Index Scores 2010. Table format: my idea

The table above shows the global ranking and total scores of all sixteen West
African states in the 2010 Fund for Peace Failed States Index Scores that ranked the
instability or stability of 177 countries globally. The deleterious consequences of
increased drug flow under the conditions of weak states are unquestionable. Ten of
West Africa’s sixteen countries are among the 50 most unstable or failed states in the
world. Contextually, this number means that almost three quarters of West Africa are
made up of failed/unstable states. Guinea Conakry topped the regional list by being
the 9th most failed/unstable state in the world, with a total score of 105.0. West
Africa’s powerhouse, Nigeria ranked the world’s 14th most failed or unstable state,
and the region’s third most failed/unstable state. It closely follows Ivory Coast which
is the region’s second and the world’s 12th most unstable or failed state. With a
miserably total score of 97.2, Guinea Bissau is the world’s 22nd and the region’s 5th
most unstable or failed state.
In the previous Failed States Index Scores dating back to 2004 until 2009, the
instability of countries in West Africa has never gotten better but worse.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Clearly, the current picture of West Africa-Latin American drug trafficking
does not look good. It remains gloomy and politically threatening to the future of the
region. Digging the region out of the deep pit it has found itself in will be quite a
monumental challenge, but it’s not insurmountable. I think that the battle for a drugfree West Africa with strong state institutions has not yet been lost. In order for the
region to have a bright future in the second decade of the 21st century, it must rid itself
of drug infiltration, but doing so will not be easy. It would entail making some very
hard choices, difficult decisions, and an extraordinary amount of sacrifice.
In a paper presented at the meeting of the Joint Committee on political affairs,
peace and security/NEPAD and Africa peer review mechanism of the ECOWAS
parliament, Dr. Abdullahi Shehu, director general for the Inter-Governmental Action
Group Against Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), extrapolated on six things that
need to be done in the fight against drug incursion in the region. Here I summarise
them in bullet points:
•

Raise the consciousness of severity of the situation

•

Created coordinated response to the threat

•

Build public awareness

•

Search for adequate funding

•

Involve the use of modern technologies

•

Provide good training of law enforcement officers

I think there is little doubt that the suggestions above deserve to be taken
seriously. There needs to be a conscious acknowledgement of the severity of the dug
problem by African leaders; there needs to be a coordinated regional response to the

drug threat; public awareness is no doubt important; adequate funding is needed to
fund serious programs; the use of modern technologies will be of great help; and
training of a professional drug enforcement team is crucial.
However, I just doing those six things is only solving the problem half-way; in
fact the problem with those six points is that they do not address the root causes of
this drug scourge, and that they raise more questions than answers to the real illicit
drug problem in West Africa.
First, there is no doubt that leaders in the region do have a conscious
knowledge of the severity of the situation. The suggestion that the leaders in the
region do not acknowledge the severity of the situation is tantamount to an insult to
the intelligence of the region’s political leaders. Moreover, the severity of the
situation varies from country to country, thus their respective leaders prioritize it
differently. There is no regional uniformity of the severity of the problem. For
example, in Ghana, where there is less negative effects of the drug scourge, leaders
there are less likely to take actions than the political leaders in Guinea-Bissau, a
country riddled with drugs virtually everywhere.
Second, it makes no sense for anyone to think of a coordinated response to the
threat of illicit drugs in a region of sixteen countries with different systems of
government, security apparatus, demography and even terrain. It is true that there is
strength in unity. But, even with existence of ECOWAS, regional coordination does
not seem feasible, considering the fact the region does not have a long history of
confronting threats together.
Third, the issue of public awareness is complex. How feasible is it to raise
awareness in a region of over five hundred different local languages. What media
would one use? How does one convince the ordinary people benefiting from the drug

trade that the practice is harmful to the welfare and the safety and security of their
respective countries? Furthermore, in a region where many people take the law into
their own hands, how does one persuade good citizens not to worry about reprisal in
the event that they give out gang information to the government? How does one get
the public awareness message to the remotest villages that have never seen a radio, a
newspaper or even a television? In a region where are there are few democracies, how
does one expect governments to show transparency in their actions, so as to build
public confidence in the masses that they are interested to educate? The chances are
zero.
Fourth, every serious public program requires sufficient funding. That is quite
obvious. However, there are some very pertinent questions that need to be asked in
regards to funding the war against illicit drug trafficking through the West African
sub-region. Which countries should be responsible for shouldering the lion’s share for
funding contribution: West African countries, Europe or the United States of
America? How do the resources get distributed among the West African nations that
are affected by the drug scourge? In other words, where would the majority of the
funds come from? What criteria would countries use to distribute the funds? And
perhaps the most important question: in a region where every level of government is
corrupt, how does one ensure that the funds meant for fighting the drug scourge don’t
end up stashed in the Swiss bank accounts of powerful and influential political leaders
and security chiefs?
Fifth, I do recognize the inescapable fact that the use of modern technologies
could be very instrumental in the fight against drug trafficking in the 21st century. But
it needs to be mentioned that West Africa is one of the poorest and least developed
regions of the world. And in such a region, the use of technology does not seem to be

the smartest suggestion to fight a problem as huge as the drug scourge that the region
faces now. It would make more sense to advocate for a heavy reliance on human
intelligence to combat drugs and their traffickers.
The sixth point that I disagree with is Dr. Shehu’s advocacy for more training
of law enforcement officers in order to tackle the drug problem in the region. In a
region where law enforcement officers are among the least paid in the world,
professional training is a nonstarter. What kind of professional training would be
sufficient to convince a patrol police officer that it is better to turn down a bribe of
thousands of dollars from a drug dealer, turn around and arrest him just for a meager
monthly government salary of few hundred dollars? No amount of professional
training can make that happen in the region. It needs to be understood and accepted
that the implementation of harsh law enforcement measures do not seem to be
working, and thus should be abandoned.
Having firmly critiqued the six suggestions laid-out by Dr Shehu in the fight
against illicit drug trafficking in West Africa, I would like to spell out my own plan or
solution to the problem. However, I believe that there are no unique or unilateral
solutions to the drug epidemic in West Africa. Nevertheless, here are the main
solutions I think can go a long way in ameliorating the illicit drug trafficking in Wes
Africa:
(1) I firmly believe that the bureaucratization of the culture of corruption and
the subsequent weakening of state civil and security institutions is a huge predicament
that needs to be tackled in the region. West Africa’s political leaders must rid their
countries of the ingrained culture of corruption at all levels of government and
society. All sixteen countries in the region need to establish anti-corruption
commissions to look into the role that bribery and corruption play in the enhancement

of the illicit drug trade. These commissions need to be composed of highly credible
members of civil society, and should be given a time frame of up to six months to
report on their findings to the political leaderships. Then, they should be required to
defend their findings and recommendations before bipartisan panels of
parliamentarians in the presence of members of the foreign diplomatic corps. Each
country’s government must be obligated to accept and execute the recommendations
by those anti-graft commissions. And in the event that a particular country
demonstrates reluctance to act upon its commission’s recommendations, the home
countries of those foreign dignitaries represented during the proceedings need to
mount pressure on them. For example, if the Guinea-Bissau government refuses to
recognize the recommendations of its anti-corruption commissions, its former colonial
power Portugal, that has an ambassador in Bissau, needs to exert enormous pressure
on the government in Bissau to act accordingly. West Africa’s leaders need to
understand that the region does not need strong men at the helm of power; it needs
strong institutions. Strong institutions that are efficient and effective can address the
problems faced by any country. Strong institutions are incorruptible, but strong men
are—the region has a lot of strong men as political leaders. Removing corruption is
also an important step in encouraging international direct investment. Foreign
investors usually pay attention on the corruption level index of a country prior to
making investment decisions. Foreign direct investors do not invest in countries that
have high levels of corruption indexes. Countries that have low levels of corruption
indexes attract foreign direct investment, which stimulates local economies, creates
employment for the youth, and raises the living standards of the citizens of host
countries.

(2) The building and sustenance of strong institutions will not be easy, and
cannot be done without foreign help. This is where the unconditional assistance from
industrialized countries such as the United States and mostly importantly the
European Union (EU) is needed. European countries need to accept that they have a
stake in the drug trade in West Africa. They need to understand that a solution to the
West African drug problem is equally a solution to their own drug problem. European
governments need to set up a huge fund dedicated to the fight against drug trafficking
in West Africa. The EU should set up a fund called the West Africa Europe AntiDrug Fund (WAEADF). The funds should be contributed by all members of the
European Union, with varying contributing quotas—EU countries affected most by
the illicit drug consumption need to contribute the most money, while the least
affected in terms of drug consumption should be asked to contribute the least money
to the fund. These funds then need to be disbursed to the various West African states
every six months. The West African states that are the worst affected by the
consequences of the illicit drug trafficking need to receive the largest disbursement,
and the least affected get the lowest money. In order to ensure transparency, each
fund-recipient country needs to provide to the WAEADF a yearly report on its
progress and the failures in the fight against drug trafficking. The more successful a
fund-recipient country is in its fight against drug trafficking, the more funding it gets
in the subsequent years. The European Union needs to establish a similar partnership
with the Latin American countries, especially the three highest producers of cocaine
and heroine in the region—Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.
(3) The third solution is one that should include all three regions: Latin
America (the producers), West Africa (the middlemen) and the European Union (the
consumers). These three regions should set up a transcontinental 9-member (three

members/experts from each region) international trade council specifically dedicated
to understanding every aspect of the illicit drug trade affecting the three regions. This
council will also be tasked with coordinating all efforts aimed at eliminating the
production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs in the three regions. This
council should also be given the opportunity to closely work with the United Nations,
the European Union, Economic Community of West African States, the African
Union, and of course the Latin American regional body.
(4) There needs to be an agricultural approach to the war on drugs. Alternative
measures need to be created for the growers of cocaine and heroine plants in the Latin
American countries. The governments of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru need to
encourage the diversification of agricultural production in their rural farming
communities by encouraging farmers to cultivate other arable crops that have high
domestic and international demand. Such legal arable crops can include: peanuts,
corn, wheat and vegetable crops that are relatively easy to sow, weed and harvest. In
addition, those Latin American governments need to offer their farmers prices to their
produce that are much more attractive than they had gotten from the cocaine and
heroin crops. By offering higher prices for legal agricultural products than illicit
drugs, there is little doubt that rural farming communities would abandon cocaine and
heroin production.
(5) West African states need to devise ways and means of restricting, auditing,
and, when appropriate, sanctioning political parties, politicians and donors who
engage in the trafficking of drugs in the region. All countries in the region need to
establish watchdog groups that have the capacity to track the complicated money trail
that often makes its way into the accounts of powerful political and influential
businessmen and women. Moreover, all West African states need to make it a

requirement for their politicians to disclose their financial information to the media
and voters before they are certified to run for any public office. Such financial
information should include local and foreign bank statements detailing cash flow in
and out of their accounts. Such a measure would expose to the ordinary voters the
politicians that are involved and profiteering from the drug trade, which has been
ruining their region over the last decade. Consequently, voters would have the
opportunity not to elect into public office any politician involved in the drug peddling.
One of the long-term effects of such a measure is that most governments in the region
would be run by decent public figures with clean records, who are dedicated to public
service, not their selfish aggrandizement.
(6) It is well documented that one of the reasons Latin American drug cartels
have used West Africa as a transit for their Europe-bound drug shipments is that it is
logistically cheap. I believe any destructive attitude that is cheap needs to be made
expensive. And I recommend the same for West Africa. The routes need to be made
expensive. Governments in the region need to make trafficking in the region a
nightmare. The more expensive it is the less inclined cocaine and heroine traffickers
will be to use the region as transit hub.
(7) Each West African state needs to establish a single institution that would
serve as a counter-narcotics focal point for national inter-ministerial and inter-agency.
This institution can also foster greater regional collaboration. The creation of such an
institution can eradicate the often competing and strained relationships that usually
exist between various government ministries and agencies that are usually tasked with
varying roles in fighting drugs. It is worth noting, that, experienced drug cartels had
often exploited the uncooperative relationships that had existed between government
ministries and agencies to engage in their illicit business. It is not an uncommon

scenario in West African countries where many government agencies do not share
intelligence on issues as pertinent as drug trafficking.
(8) Every quarter, each West African country needs to conduct exhaustive and
strong investigations that target two leading drug trafficking cartels of networks and
bring them to justice. If this counter-narcotic measure becomes successful in all West
African countries, there will be a total 24 drug cartels or networks taken off the streets
in the entire region every three months. That would mean the elimination of 96 drug
cartels or networks from the entire region in just 12 months! Practically speaking, the
region would rid itself of drugs within a very short period of time.
(9) There needs to be a long-term bottom-up educational approach to the war
against drugs in West Africa. The children in the region need to be educated about the
negative consequences of illicit drugs in their communities. The education ministries
in all sixteen countries need to convene a regional conference that will look into ways
and means of incorporating the study of drugs in their school syllabuses either as a
component of their science or social studies subjects or as a separate field of study.
The study of drugs should be included in the syllabuses from elementary/primary
schools to high schools— probably starting from the first to the twelfth grade. I
believe this approach will be more cost effective and have more lasting effects than a
so-called short-term public awareness campaign using the media. The inclusion of
drug studies in a school system syllabus is undoubtedly cheaper than a mass media
campaign aimed at an audience that is either skeptical or not listening. Furthermore,
it is psychologically easier to persuade young and tender minds than older ones.
(10) All West African states need to set aside a special date annually and
declare it as West Africa Drug-Free Day. It would be better if the entire region
annually observes this day on a single date. During every annual observance, all

sectors of society need to exclusively dedicate their entire day on the issue of drug
enlightenment. On this day, the issue of drugs should dominate electronic media
programming, print media pages, discussion topics in town squares, social media
chatter forums, classroom lessons, and even political rallies by all politicians
irrespective of political affiliations.
(11) Another solution to the West Africa Latin America drug trafficking
problem is through co-coordinating the actions of international agencies against drug
trafficking. One such agency is the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL). This agency is non-political and it is the clearinghouse of information
for police forces around the world. In other words, since its establishment, Interpol
has been a forum for contact and cooperation among police agencies from around the
world. West African states need to establish a stronger cooperation with Interpol so
that they can have easier access to the agency’s centralized database that contains
reports and tip-offs on international crimes including transnational illicit drug
trafficking. There is no doubt that a country’s easy access to such a valuable global
database will enable its police to have access to quick information about drug
trafficking activities that may be happening within its political borders. Timely access
to important information—one of the main obstacles to police activity in the region—
will definitely lead to more arrest of traffickers en-route and raids on drug cartel
hideouts.
(12) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which is the
global body’s arm that deals with drugs and crimes, could be very helping to West
African states in their crusade against illicit drug trafficking. West African states need
to maximize their use of the human, material, financial and logistical resources that
the UNDOC has at its disposal for UN member states. West African states should tap

into the funds, the expertise and the loads of documents of information, which the
UNODC has, about the drug trafficking in the region. They can do that by seeking
smart anti-narcotics strategies and garnering financial help from the UNODC.
Furthermore, West African states need to hire the drug experts at the UNODC to help
them formulate goal-oriented anti-drug policies that will produce better results in their
war against drugs. I do know the region is not suffering from the lack of sufficient
anti-drug experts. However, it won’t hurt if the region’s various anti-drug agencies or
ministries co-opt renowned drug experts from the UNODC to work together with the
local talent. Lastly, it is often said that the provision of accurate information often
results in sound decision-making processes. And that’s why West African states need
to have more access to valuable UNODC facts and figures about the true picture of
the drug trafficking situation in the region. As one of the poorest regions in the world,
it’s hard to think of a way that the region can successfully combat this illicit scourge
without the help of the UNODC.
I believe there are no perfect solutions to the Latin American drug trafficking
problems in West Africa. But one thing is clear: doing nothing about it is no solution
either. Something really serious needs to be done. West African states need to harness
all the resources, expertise and funds at their disposal, and aggressively but smartly
confront this scourge that has weakened state political and security institutions, the
consequence of can lead to instability for the region. I believe Latin American drugs
are a ticking time bomb hovering over West Africa.

Fig. 1: The map of present-day
present
West Africa

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AFRICOM==United States Africa Command
BBC==British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA==Central Intelligence Agency
CPI==Corruption Perception Index
DEA==United States Drug Enforcement Agency
DRC==Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS==Economic Community of West African States
EU==European Union
GDP==Gross Domestic Product
GIABA==The Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West
Africa
INTERPOL==International Criminal Police Organization
MPLA==Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
NEPAD==New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO==Non-Governmental Organizations
TI==Transparency International
UN===United Nations
UNDCP==United Nations Drug Control Program
UNITA==Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNODC===United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WAEADF==West Africa Europe Anti-Drug Fund
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